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Introduction
This paper studies the incentives of an innovative firm to patent its process innovation in an oligopoly. A patent discloses the technology to the firm's competitors, and gives some protection against expropriation of the disclosed technology. However, patents are imperfect. They only give protection with a certain probability (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005) . Moreover, surveys in the US (Levin et al., 1987, and Cohen et al., 2000) and Europe (Arundel, 2001) find that high-level executives do not consider patenting the most effective appropriability mechanism for process innovations. Instead, secrecy was often considered as a more effective way to protect those innovations. In spite of the perceived weak protection, firms do apply for patents (e.g., Kim and Marschke, 2004, and Hall, 2005) . One reason for this is that a patent enables a firm to signal information about its innovation in a credible, verifiable way (Long, 2002) . 1 In this paper, I analyze this motive and explore its economic consequences.
I analyze the patenting incentives in a model of asymmetric information about the size of an innovation. In such a setting an innovative firm faces the following tradeoff. On the one hand, patenting a technology is a way to persuade the competitor of the technology's efficiency. This creates a signaling effect. On the other hand, the potential expropriation of a patented technology yields a more efficient, and more "aggressive" competitor in the product market. This expropriation effect gives the innovative firm a disincentive to apply for a patent. The innovative firm manages the expectations of its competitor in the product market, and thereby affects his conduct, by patenting certain technologies while keeping other technologies secret.
A firm can patent selectively by making different patenting choices for different innovations. Selective patenting of an indivisible innovation gives either a patented innovation or a trade secret.
2 This makes patents and trade secrets substitutes. By contrast, if an innovation is divisible, the firm can also choose to patent only certain parts of any given innovation, while keeping the remaining parts secret. In this case, patenting and secrecy are complementary strategies. Whether the intellectual property strategies are substitutes or complements in practice remains an open issue. At first sight, data from the Yale Survey and Carnegie Mellon Survey (CMS) in the US, and the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) seem to support at most weak a Cournot oligopolist has an incentive to patent big innovations, and keep small innovations secret. Indeed, an innovative firm may adopt this strategy, if a patent gives a moderate risk of expropriation. Further, if patenting gives a high risk of expropriation, the expropriation effect tends to dominate, and a Cournot competitor keeps its innovation secret. Conversely, for patents with a low risk of expropriation, the signaling effect tends to dominate, and all innovations are patented (Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990) . Empirical findings by Mäkinen (2007) , Moser (2010), and Pajak (2010) are consistent with the strategy of patenting big innovations to a greater extent than small innovations. 6, 7 Interestingly, Anton and Yao (2003) obtain the opposite prediction in a related model with divisible innovations, i.e., small innovations are patented to a greater extent than big innovations. 8 A firm with a divisible innovation can signal the innovation's size by patenting only a small part of its innovation. However, in my paper such a strategy is not feasible, since I consider an indivisible innovation.
A change of the mode of competition from competition in quantities to competition in prices changes the direction of the signaling effect. A Bertrand oligopolist only discloses inefficient technologies to persuade the competitor that he will face relaxed competition in the product market (strategic complements). That is, competition in prices gives an incentive to patent different technologies than competition in quantities. Pajak (2010) finds that small firms in the French intermediate goods industry are more likely to patent small innovations than big innovations, which is consistent with these incentives. As far as I know, my paper is the first to analyze the tradeoff between signaling and expropriation in a model of Bertrand competition, and to compare the two modes of competition.
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A switch from a market where firms strategically set output levels In innovation-level data on Finnish product innovations from 1985 , Mäkinen (2007 finds that more novel and significant product innovations were patented more often than smaller innovations. Moser (2010) finds in innovation-level data on UK and US innovations at World Fairs from 1851-1915 that award-winning innovations were more likely to be patented. When considering all small innovative firms in France together, Pajak (2010) finds in firm-level data of the 2004 CIS that large product innovations are more likely to be patented. 7 Alternatively, such a patenting strategy could also be consistent with a model in which a nonstrategic firm chooses between patenting at a fixed cost and secrecy. However, such a model would yield no patenting for industries where secrecy gives better protection against expropriation than patenting. That is, it would not resolve the patent paradox. Moreover, Moser (2010) finds only a weak elasticity with respect to patenting fees, when comparing patenting by UK and US innovators.
8 Anton and Yao (2003) differs in a second respect from my paper. Whereas Anton and Yao study a drastic innovation, I consider a non-drastic innovation. However, Appendix C suggests that Anton and Yao's qualitative result also holds in a model with a non-drastic (divisible) innovation.
9 Yao (2003, 2004) , Gill (2008) , and Jansen (2006 Jansen ( , 2010 analyze the trade-off between expropriation and signaling in models with strategic substitutability in the production stage. petition), to a market where they set prices (Bertrand competition) increases the competitive pressure for the firms (e.g., see Singh and Vives, 1984) . By comparing the patenting strategies of a Cournot competitor with the strategy of a Bertrand competitor, I make a fir s ts t e pi nc h a r a c t e r i z i n gt h ee ffect of competitive pressure on patenting strategies. In addition, by applying insights from the theory of monotone comparative statics (e.g., see Vives, 2005 , for an excellent survey), I characterize the effects of changes in two alternative measures of competitive pressure. First, increasing the number of non-innovative firms in the industry intensifies product market competition. Second, an increase in the degree of product substitutability is an alternative way of increasing the competitive pressure. These analyses try to contribute to the current debate on the effects of competitive pressure on innovative activity. The existing literature typically focuses on the relationship between competitive pressure and incentives to create new knowledge (see, e.g., Belleflamme and Vergari, 2006 , Gilbert, 2006 , Vives, 2008 , and Schmutzler, 2010 . By contrast, I study the effects of competitive pressure on the incentives to diffuse new knowledge. In other words, my analysis is complementary to the existing literature.
The different measures of competitive pressure affect the patenting incentives in different ways, since they have different effects on the responsiveness of the firms' product market strategies. Whereas non-innovative firms become less responsive to changes in the prices or output levels of an innovative firm when their number grows, they become more responsive when products become closer substitutes. More responsive competitors tend to adjust their strategies more drastically when they become informed about the size of the innovation. Hence, more responsive product market strategies of competitors tend to give a relatively stronger signaling effect, and thereby a greater incentive to patent an innovation. The paper confirms that a greater substitutability between goods gives more patenting. Moreover, an increase in the number of non-innovative firms gives less patenting when firms compete in prices. By contrast, when firms compete in output levels, an increase in the number of non-innovative competitors gives more patenting. This is due to a greater responsiveness of the innovative firm's output strategy to output changes of its competitors. 10 10 Empirical analyses that consider the effect of competitive pressure on the propensity to patent are scarce and inconclusive. Mäkinen (2007) finds only a weakly significant negative effect (i.e., as for entry in a Bertrand oligopoly), by taking competition to be intense if price competition is at least an important factor for initiating the development of an innovation. Duguet and Kabla (1998) find no significant effect from the logarithms of the average market share and the average Herfindahl concentration index on patent propensity. A careful, empirical analysis of the relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the propensity to patent awaits future research.
My paper also relates to recent literature on endogenous knowledge spillovers. For example, De Fraja (1993), Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) , Kamien and Zang (2000) , Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003) , Fosfuri and Rønde (2004) , Encaoua and Lefouili (2006), and Milliou (2009) analyze the choice of technology diffusion in oligopoly models of complete information.
11 Whereas expropriation of technological knowledge affects the spillover choice in these papers, there is no role for signaling. By contrast, signaling plays a central role in my model. The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium product market strategies under patenting and trade secrecy, and the equilibrium patenting strategies. Section 4 discusses the effects of competitive pressure on the incentive to patent an innovation. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper. Appendix A contains the proofs of the paper's propositions, Appendix B gives more detailed derivations, and Appendix C covers three extensions.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider N +1 risk-neutral firms, firm I and firms 1, .., N, producing differentiated goods, with N ≥ 1.F i r mI, the innovative firm, obtains a patentable non-drastic process innovation, which yields a production cost
12 The production cost θ I is private information to firm I.F i r m s1, .., N, the non-innovative firms, have an inefficient, non-patentable technology, with the production cost θ,i . e . , θ 1 = ... = θ N = θ.
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After firm I learns its cost, it makes its patent choice. Firm I chooses whether to file for a patent and consequently reveal its cost truthfully, s(θ I )=θ I ,o rt ok e e p its cost secret and send the uninformative message s(θ I )=∅.T h efirm's patenting strategy can be written as follows:
where S ⊆ [θ, θ] denotes the set of technologies that are kept secret. 12 This specification allows for uncertainty about the existence of an innovation by assigning a positive probability mass to the atom θ I = θ.
13 The assumption that there is only one innovative firm is made for simplicity. Section 5 discusses the patenting incentives when there are more innovative firms in the industry.
14 Alternatively, instead of the uninformative message, ∅, a secretive firm could choose to release 5 Patents are always granted, but their validity is challenged in court. 15 The firm's patent for the new technology is successfully defended in court with probability γ P , where 0 ≤ γ P < 1. However, with probability 1 − γ P the patent is invalid, and the firms 1, .., N can imitate the patent holder's technology without incurring any cost.
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A trade secret remains secret with probability γ S , but with probability 1 − γ S the secret leaks out to the competitors, enabling them to imitate the leaked technology at no additional cost. To make the problem interesting, I assume that imitation is more likely under patenting than under secrecy γ P <γ S ≤ 1. 17 For the analysis of patent incentives there is no loss of generality to set γ S =1and γ P = γ with γ<1. 18 The parameter γ measures the relative protection of patents vis-à-vis secrets. Finally, after messages are received and the validity of the patent is determined, firms set the output levels of their differentiated goods simultaneously (Cournot competition).
19 Firm with cost θ chooses its output, q ≥ 0, and earns the profit:
with ∈ {I,1,..,N}. At the outputs q ≡ (q I ,q 1 , .., q N ), the inverse demand for the good of firm is linear in quantities:
with , k ∈ {I,1,..,N}. 20 Firm I's innovation is non-drastic, i.e., I assume that the commonly available technology θ. This would give the same effects on competition, i.e., no expropriation and no precise signal about the firm's actual technology. When secretive types pool with the worst type of the innovative firm, and the worst type has a positive probability mass (i.e., there is uncertainty about the existence of an innovation), this has an effect on the beliefs of the non-innovative firms. However, this does not change the qualitative results of the paper. 15 The assumption that a firm with the worst technology draw (i.e., θ I = θ) can get a patent is made for simplicity. Given free access to the existing, old technology, a patent of θ I = θ only serves as a certification device, since imitation is irrelevant for θ I = θ. Hence, this assumption gives the same results as the alternative assumption that a patent of technology θ is always invalid. 16 Clearly, the probability of holding an invalid patent can also be interpreted as the probability with which the patent validity is challenged in court, and the defense of the patent fails.
17 A model with stronger patent protection (i.e., γ P ≥ γ S ) would yield the patenting of all technologies in equilibrium, since the signaling benefits of patenting (e.g., Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990) would be reinforced by the benefit of less or equally frequent expropriation. Assuming γ P <γ S is consistent with theoretical work (Anton and Yao, 2003) and empirical findings (Cohen et al., 2000) . 18 If Π P is the profit from a valid patent, Π S is the profit from a secret, and Π I is the profita f t e r imitation, then the expected profit gain from patenting instead of secrecy is:
Clearly, the sign of this net profiti st h es a m ea st h es i g no f :
Later, in section 3.2, I also consider the model in which firms set prices (Bertrand competition) . 20 In this model of Cournot competition, one can also interpret the innovation as a product innovation, where the representative consumer's intrinsic willingness-to-pay for the innovation is α − θ I . α ≥ 2θ − θ.P a r a m e t e r β represents the degree of product differentiation, with 0 <β≤ 1.T h eg r e a t e rβ, the more substitutable the firms' goods.
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I solve the game backwards, and restrict the analysis to pure-strategy equilibria.
Equilibrium Strategies

Cournot Competition
First, I derive the equilibrium output levels for any given patent choice and belief. Subsequently, I characterize the equilibrium patenting strategies.
Output Strategies
Suppose that firm anticipates that its competitor k has a marginal cost θ k in the technology subset T k ⊆ [θ, θ], and uses the output strategy q k (θ k ) for θ k ∈ T k .M a x imization of expected profits by firm with marginal cost θ then yields the following best response function (for , k ∈ {I,1, .., N}):
If firm has marginal cost θ , it expects marginal costs P k6 = E{θ k |θ k ∈ T k } from its competitors, and the competitors believe that firm 's marginal cost is in the subset T , then the firm sets the following output in equilibrium:
In particular, three situations can emerge. In the first two situations, the firms choose outputs under complete information. These situations emerge after firm I patents its technology θ I , i.e., T I = {θ I }. The cost of non-innovative firms 1, .., N depends on the validity of firm I's patent. First, if the patent is valid, then the noninnovative firms cannot adopt the new technology, i.e., θ n = θ and T n = {θ} for n = 1,...,N. In equilibrium, the outputs are q c I (θ I ,Nθ; {θ I }) and q c n (θ, θ I +(N − 1)θ; {θ I }) for n =1 , .., N. Second, if the patent is invalid, then imitation gives all firms the 21 For example, the markets are independent for β =0, and the goods are homogeneous for β =1.
marginal cost θ I . In this case, each firm sets the symmetric equilibrium output level q c (θ I ,Nθ I ; {θ I }) for ∈ {I,1, .., N}.
Finally, after firm I adopts secrecy there is asymmetric information about firm I's marginal cost θ I (i.e., T I = S for some S ⊆ [θ, θ]), and no imitation is possible (i.e., θ n = θ and T n = {θ} for n =1 , ..., N). Consequently, the equilibrium output levels are q c I (θ I ,Nθ; S) and q c n (θ, E{θ I |θ I ∈ S} +(N − 1)θ; {θ}) for n =1,..,N. In any case, firm 's profite q u a l s :
Patenting Strategies
Firm I with innovation θ I bases its patenting decision on the comparison of the profit from secrecy, π where 0 <γ o < 1. 
β there exists an equilibrium with θ <θ c < θ.
The intuition for this result lies in the analysis of the signaling effect. Since firms compete in output levels in the product market, their product market strategies are strategic substitutes. Consequently, if firm I discloses a technology which is less efficient than expected, then the non-innovative firms adjust their outputs upwards (i.e., they "move up" along their best response curves), and become more aggressive competitors. That is, in this case the expropriation effect and the signaling effect reinforce each other, and give a disincentive to apply for a patent. Conversely, disclosure of a t e c h n o l o g yw h i c hi sm o r ee fficient than expected makes the non-innovative firms less aggressive competitors in the product market (strategic substitutes). That is, in this case the expropriation and signaling effect conflict, and the patenting incentives are determined by their trade-off.
Extreme strengths of intellectual property right give the following incentives. On the one hand, perfect protection (i.e., γ → 1) eliminates the expropriation effect of patenting a technology. The remaining signaling effect gives firm I an incentive to patent any technologies with above-average efficiency levels. This drives the expected cost level of secret technologies up to the highest cost level (i.e., S = {θ}). In other words, for γ approaching 1 the unraveling result applies (Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990) , yielding full patenting in equilibrium (i.e., θ c = θ).
On the other hand, in the absence of patent protection (γ =0 ), the expropriation effect outweighs the signaling effect. Patenting of technology θ I would enable the non-innovative firms to imitate, and set output levels q c n (θ I ,Nθ I ; {θ I }) for n =1, .., N. By contrast, trade secrecy enables non-innovative firms to set an equilibrium output level of at most q c n (θ, Nθ; {θ}). That is, trade secrecy yields less aggressive competitors when imitation is certain, since q and SP stand for full patenting, full secrecy, and selective patenting, respectively.
These equilibrium strategies differ from the strategies in Anton and Yao (2003) . The innovative firm in Anton and Yao patents small innovations to a greater extent than big innovations, whereas here the reverse tends to happen. The model of Anton and Yao (2003) has a divisible and drastic innovation, whereas my model has an indivisible, non-drastic innovation. The analysis in Appendix C suggests that also a model with a divisible, non-drastic innovation yields more patenting of small innovations than big innovations, as in Anton and Yao (2003) . In particular, in the absence of protection (i.e., γ =0), the innovative firm chooses the equilibrium strat-
)θ, which means that the firm patents only technologies of relatively low efficiency (i.e., θ I ≥
)θ), while it does not patent technologies that are more efficient. Similar equilibrium strategies emerge for weak patent protection (for more details, see Appendix C). Clearly, such a strategy is not feasible for a firm with an indivisible innovation. That is, the assumption of indivisibility of the innovation has a non-trivial effect on the strategies that the innovative firm chooses in equilibrium. By contrast, for sufficiently strong protection (i.e., γ ≥ 1 − β 2 ), the signaling effect dominates, which gives the innovative firm an incentive to patent its innovation completely. This is analogous to my result in Proposition 1(b).
Bertrand Competition
Now I turn to the model in which firms choose the prices of their goods simultaneously in the last stage (Bertrand competition). In particular, firm with cost θ chooses its price, p ≥ 0, and earns the profit:
for ∈ {I,1,..,N}.H e r eD (p) is the direct demand at prices p ≡ (p I ,p 1 , .., p N ):
where , k ∈ {I,1,..,N}. I assume that the goods are sufficiently differentiated (i.e., β is sufficiently low), such that all firms produce in equilibrium.
Pricing Strategies
Firm with marginal cost θ , who anticipates that its competitor's marginal cost θ k is in the subset T k ⊆ [θ, θ], has the following best response function:
If firm has marginal cost θ , it expects marginal costs P k6 = E{θ k |θ k ∈ T k } from its competitors, and the competitors believe that firm 's marginal cost is in the subset T , then the firm sets the following price in equilibrium
for , k ∈ {I,1, .., N}, with the equilibrium margin:
After firm I patents its technology θ I ,thefirms set prices under complete information. If the patent is valid, then firm I chooses the margin m b I (θ I ,Nθ; {θ I }) in equilibrium, while the non-innovative firm n set m b n (θ, θ I +(N − 1)θ; {θ}) for n =1, ..., N.I f the patent is invalid, each firm has the marginal cost θ I , and chooses m b (θ I ,Nθ I ; {θ I })
for ∈ {I,1,..,N}.
Finally, if firm I adopts secrecy, the non-innovative firms remain uninformed about the technology θ I , and anticipate the patenting strategy (2.1) for some S ⊆ [θ, θ]. In equilibrium the firms I and n =1 ,..,N choose the margins m b I (θ I ,Nθ; S) and m b n (θ, E{θ I |θ I ∈ S} +(N − 1)θ; {θ}), respectively.
In any case, in equilibrium firm supplies the following output level and earns the following expected profit, respectively (for ∈ {I,1, .., N}):
Patenting Strategies
The patenting choice of a firm that competes in prices (strategic complements) also trades off the expropriation effect and a signaling effect. For technologies with aboveaverage efficiency levels both effects of patenting are negative. In particular, potential expropriation of the technology makes the rivals (firms 1, .., N) compete more aggressively. Moreover, the rivals update their beliefs in an unfavorable direction, since they learn that firm I is more efficient (and aggressive) than expected. This makes the rivals compete even more aggressively, since the actions are strategic complements. In short, the firm has no incentive to patent any efficient technologies. This brief description of the patenting incentives already suggests that the firm's patenting strategies under Bertrand competition differ from the patenting strategies under Cournot competition. Whereas the firm may choose to patent only efficient technologies under Cournot competition, it has a clear disincentive to do so under Bertrand competition.
For technologies with a below-average efficiency level the two effects of patenting are in conflict. On the one hand, the expropriation effect still gives firm I an incentive to keep the technology secret. However, on the other hand, now the signaling effect gives an incentive to apply for a patent. For sufficiently high cost parameters the signaling effect outweighs the expropriation effect, and disclosure softens the conduct of the non-innovative firms in the product market. That is, although imitation of a minor innovation makes the firms 1, .., N slightly more productive competitors, the firms charge a higher price, since they drastically downgrade their beliefs about the aggressiveness of firm I's pricing strategy. 23 As a result, firm I has an incentive to patent such a technology. In short, firm I has an incentive to patent inefficient technologies, and keep efficient technologies secret. In other words, a Bertrand competitor always patents some technologies in equilibrium. In the limit, for γ → 1,t h ee x p r o p r i a t i o ne ffect vanishes, and firm I patents all technologies (i.e., lim γ→1 θ b = θ). As before, the unraveling result holds in this case. Interestingly, even in the absence of intellectual property rights (i.e., γ =0 ) firm I shares some technologies in equilibrium. In spite of the full expropriation of any disclosed technology, the innovative firm still has an incentive to share some technologies with its competitors (i.e., any θ I >θ b ), as is shown in Proposition 2. This results from the firm's incentive to strategically manage its competitors' expectations in the product market. Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium patenting incentives for a Bertrand duopolist (N =1)intheabsenceofpatentprotection(γ =0). The bold lines represent the best
response functions of the firms for extreme technologies, i.e., r b I (p n ; θ) and r b I (p n ; θ) for firm I,a n dr b n (p I ; θ) and r b n (p I ; θ) for firm n.I ffirm I shares its technology, the equilibrium prices correspond to a point on the line T-T 0 .F o re x a m p l e ,i ft h efirm has technology θ and shares it, the equilibrium prices correspond to point T 0 ;i fi ts h a r e s θ b , then the firms reach equilibrium point E; sharing technology θ yields point T.
The adoption of secrecy gives the following. Firm n has technology θ and it believes that firm I has a pricing strategy that corresponds to the expected best response E{r 
Comparative Statics
In the next sections I consider comparative statics results for the extremal equilibrium thresholds (Milgrom and Roberts, 1994) , since there may be multiple equilibria.
24
That is, I consider the effects of changing a parameter value on the lowest and highest equilibrium thresholds of the patenting strategies s c in Proposition 1 and s b in Proposition 2. An increase of the patent validity parameter γ (i.e., stronger patent protection) yields more patenting in equilibrium, as the following proposition shows. In other words, the stronger the patent protection, the weaker the expropriation effect, and the stronger firm I's incentive to patent the technology. This is intuitive.
The uniform technology distribution (i.e., F (θ I )=(θ I − θ)/(θ − θ) for θ I ∈ [θ, θ]) yields an easy solution. Figure 3 illustrates the proposition for a uniformly distributed technology θ I . The bold lines in Figure 3 Skewing the distribution towards inefficient technologies (by increasing λ)g i v e s a stronger signaling effect to a Cournot competitor. The disclosure of an efficient technology by a patent creates a more drastic update of the non-innovative firms' beliefs, and thereby a greater output effect. The stronger signaling effect gives a greater incentive to patent technologies. The reverse holds for a Bertrand competitor that considers patenting an inefficient technology. An increase of λ yields a weaker signaling effect, which gives the innovative firm a smaller patenting incentive.
For example, truncated exponential distributions satisfy the condition in Proposition 4. Assume that the technology θ I lies in interval £ 0, θ ¤ , and has the distribution 
Competitive Pressure
In this section I analyze the effects of competitive pressure on the incentives to patent the technology θ I . First, I increase the competitive pressure by switching from competition in output levels (Cournot) to competition in prices (Bertrand). Second, I increase the number of non-innovative firms in the industry. Finally, I increase the degree of substitutability between products.
Mode of Competition
The competitive pressure on the innovative firm increases when the firms switch from competition in quantities to competition in prices (Singh and Vives, 1984) . The comparison of equilibrium patenting strategies of Propositions 1 and 2 depends on the strength of intellectual property right protection (γ).
In particular, for sufficiently weak patent protection (e.g.,
an innovative firm patents more technologies under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. For these parameter values a firm adopts full secrecy under Cournot competition, while it adopts a selective patenting strategy, where the worst technologies are patented, under Bertrand competition. In other words, there is a greater diffusion of technology under Bertrand competition with weak protection. 25 In particular, the conditional expected costs are E{θ I |θ I >x} = λ + 
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If, however, protection is sufficiently strong (e.g., γ ≥ max{1 − 
Number of Competitors
The competitive pressure on the innovative firm increases when the number of noninnovative firms, N, increases (Boone, 2000) . Increasing N gives the following. In other words, in equilibrium the entry of non-innovative firms gives a Cournot competitor a greater or equal incentive to patent its innovation, while it gives a Bertrand competitor a smaller incentive to apply for a patent.
An analysis of the best response functions can provide some intuition for these results. The best response function r c I (q −I ; θ I ) in (3.1), which captures the output strategy of firm I, is only a function of the cumulative output of the non-innovative firms, Q N ≡ P N k=1 q k . Therefore, it can be redefined as the best response to the cumulative output per non-innovative firm:
with b q N ≡ Q N /N . Adding the best response functions of non-innovative firms, r c n (q −n ; θ n ) in (3.1) for n =1, .., N with θ 1 = ... = θ N , and solving for the sum of their outputs, Q N , at any output of firm I, and dividing by N, gives the cumulative best response per non-innovative firm:
The solution of (4.1) and (4.2) gives the equilibrium output levels of the innovative firm and a non-innovative firm. Analogously for Bertrand competition, the system of best response functions r b (p − ; θ ) in (3.7) for ∈ {I,1, .., N} can be transformed into firm I's best response to the cumulative price per non-innovative firm, and the cumulative best response per non-innovative firm, respectively: Figure 4 illustrates these best responses for a given belief about firm I's technology (i.e., for some given subset S), and N 0 >N.I np a r t i c u l a r , Figure 4(a) illustrates the equilibrium output levels of the innovative firm with the most efficient technology, θ I = θ.I f t h i s firm adopts secrecy and it has N competitors, it supplies the output corresponding to point B in Fig. 4(a) . If firm I patents the technology θ and has N competitors, it reaches point D when the patent is valid, and it reaches point C when the patent is invalid. An increase in the number of non-innovative firms has the following effects on firm I's patenting incentive. On the one hand, it makes the best response R A l le l s ee q u a l ,t h i sg i v e st h eo p po s i t ee ffects (i.e., vertical distance B-D decreases relative to distance C-D, and vertical distance B-C decreases), which is favorable for the expropriation effect. Proposition 5 shows that the former effect dominates the latter. T h a ti s ,t h eo v e r a l le ffect of increasing N is to strengthen the signaling effect relative to the expropriation effect, and thereby give a greater incentive to apply for a patent. As Fig. 4(a) illustrates for an increase from N to N 0 , the best response R Fig. 4(b) . If firm I has a technology such that its best response curve runs through point E, then the firm is indifferent between secrecy and technology sharing. The firm prefers to keep more efficient technologies secret, while it shares less efficient technologies. Second, similarincentivesemergeincasethereareN 0 non-innovative firms. An increase in the number of non-innovative firms (e.g. from N to N 0 )m a k e st h ei n n o v a t i v efirm's best response function R b I steeper, whereas it makes a non-innovative firm's cumulative best response R b N less steep, as is illustrated in the figure. Both effects give a higher cost θ I at which firm I is indifferent between secrecy and technology sharing, for a given belief. In Fig. 4(b) this is captured by the fact that the distance A 0 -E 0 exceeds the distance A-E, whereas the distance A 0 -B 0 equals the distance A-B for a given belief about firm I's technology. Therefore, all else equal, firm I has an incentive to keep more technologies secret after the number of non-innovative firms grows. 27 The 26 An increase of N also shifts both best response functions inwards (towards the origin), but this does not affect firm I's incentives to patent its technology. 27 For example, the uniform technology distribution gives a unique patenting equilibrium. In the absence of protection, the patenting strategy for a uniformly distributed technology has the threshold value:
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proposition shows that this holds also in the presence of patent protection.
Product Differentiation
An alternative way of increasing the competitive pressure on the innovative firm is to increase the degree of substitutability between products, β (Boone, 2000) .
The following proposition shows that an increase of the product substitutability tends to increase patenting in equilibrium. A greater product substitutability gives an innovative firm a (weakly) greater incentive to patent its innovation when the firms compete in quantities. An increase of β makes the best response functions R At the extreme where goods approach independence (i.e., β → 0), the signaling effect diminishes. The remaining expropriation effect gives firm I a disincentive to patent its technology. In the limit firm I does not patent any technology (i.e., lim β→0 θ b = θ and lim β→0 θ c = θ). 29 For positive degrees of substitutability the firm may have an incentive to patent some technologies in equilibrium (Propositions 1 and 28 For example, in the absence of patent protection, the uniform technology distribution gives the unique threshold θ
29 Clearly, if β =0 , the markets are independent, and firm I is indifferent between patenting and secrecy. As a consequence, any patenting strategy can be sustained as an equilibrium strategy. If β<0, then the goods are complements. As before, imitation gives the non-innovative firms an incentive to set lower prices (higher outputs). In the case of complementary goods, the competitors' price reduction (resp., output expansion) increases the demand and profit of the innovative firm. In 2). This suggests that, at least locally (for β close to zero), patenting incentives are growing in the degree of substitutability. Proposition 6 confirms this.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I analyzed the effects of probabilistic patent validity on strategic patent c h o i c e si na no l i g o p o l yw i t ha s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a t i o n ,a n dd i fferentiated goods. A Cournot competitor tends to patent big innovations, and keep small innovations secret, while a Bertrand competitor adopts the reverse strategy.
Changing the mode of product market competition has interesting effects on the diffusion of knowledge. If the patent protection is weak, then an innovative firm patents more technologies under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. For sufficiently weak protection of intellectual property a firm adopts full secrecy under Cournot competition, while it adopts a selective patenting strategy under Bertrand competition. In this case, the bigger diffusion of technology increases the expected consumer surplus under Bertrand competition, which widens the surplus gap between Bertrand and Cournot competition.
If,ho w ever,protectionissufficiently strong, but imperfect, then an innovative firm patents more technologies under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. Whereas a Cournot competitor patents any innovation (due to an unraveling result), a Bertrand competitor resorts to a selective patenting strategy. In this case the greater technology diffusion under Cournot competition increases the expected consumer surplus under Cournot competition, and reduces the surplus gap between Bertrand and Cournot competition.
Different measures of competitive pressure have different effects on the incentives to patent a process innovation. An increase in the degree of substitutability tends to increase the patenting incentives of accommodating firms. The effect of an increase in the number of firms depends on the mode of competition in the product market. An increase in the number of non-innovative firms gives an innovative firm a greater incentive to patent when firms compete in output levels, but a smaller incentive when firms compete in prices. In the latter case, an increase in the number of non-innovative firms has two conflicting effect on the expected consumer surplus. On the one hand, it increases the expected consumer surplus for a given level of technology diffusion.
other words, expropriation gives the innovative firm an extra incentive to apply for a patent. Hence, the basic trade-off between expropriation and signaling disappears, and the standard unraveling result applies (i.e., the innovative firm patents all technologies), whenever the goods are complementary. This is a direct effect. On the other hand, it reduces the expected surplus through a reduction in the diffusion of technology. This is an indirect effect. That is, the strategic management of intellectual property reduces the surplus gain from entry of non-innovative firms. This may have implications for the optimal economic policy towards entry in innovative industries with weak intellectual property right protection.
T h em o d e la s s u m e st h a tt h efirms choose their product market variables after the patent validity is determined. Alternatively, one could consider the model where the patent validity is determined after the firms set their product market variables. In the subgame that starts after the innovative firm patents its technology, a noninnovative firm chooses its product market variable that maximizes its expected profit at the expected cost γθ +(1− γ)θ I . That is, in this model with reversed timing, the profit from patenting is the profit at the competitors' expected cost, instead of the expected profit at the competitors' realized costs. Although this changes the size of the profitd i fference, it does not change the direction in which this difference changes with parameter values (see Appendix C for further details). Therefore, reversing the timing has no effect on the qualitative results.
The model with Bertrand competition can be extended easily by allowing all firms to be innovative. In a simple model where patents are invalid (i.e., γ =0 ), and the technologies of firms are independent draws from their technology distributions, a firm with access to a competitor's technologies adopts the most productive technology. This could be its own or its competitor's technology. Therefore, it is uncertain whether a shared technology will be adopted or not, since this depends on the relative efficiency of both firms' technology draws. Whereas in the model with one-sided asymmetric information the probability of imitation was exogenously fixed, here it depends on the size of the innovation, and the technology distribution of the competitor. In spite of this difference, the firms' incentives to share technologies are similar to the incentives with one-sided asymmetric information (see also Appendix C). As before, a firm's technology-sharing strategy trades off an expropriation effect against a signaling effect. Moreover, a higher cost draw gives a weaker expropriation effect and a stronger signaling effect. Consequently, each firm shares inefficient technologies while it keeps efficient technologies secret as in Proposition 2. Jansen (2010) shows that the introduction of several innovative fir m si nt h em o d e lw i t hC o u r n o tc o m p e t i t i o nh a s more subtle effects on the firms' patenting incentives.
Appendix
A Proofs of Propositions P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Suppose that the non-innovative firms have beliefs that are consistent with patenting strategy (2.1). Then firm I keeps technology θ I secret if and only if inequality (3.3) holds. This inequality is equivalent to Φ c (θ I ; S) ≥ 0 where: ,a n dt a k eγ o <γ<1 − β 4
. If there exists an equilibrium with S =[θ c , θ] for some θ <θ c < θ, then the threshold θ c is a root of function: 
where the last equality follows from the application of the De L'Hospital rule, i.e.,
. Hence, for any
, the intermediate value theorem implies that there exists an interior θ c such that e Φ c (θ c )=0 ,s i n c e e Φ c (θ) < 0 < lim θ↑θ e Φ c (θ),a n d e Φ c is continuous in θ. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Suppose that the non-innovative firms have beliefs that are consistent with patenting strategy (2.1). Then firm I keeps technology θ I secret if and only if inequality (3.3) holds, with π c replaced by π b . This inequality is equivalent to Φ b (θ I ; S) ≥ 0 where:
Using (3.9), this function can be written as:
It is straightforward to show that Φ b is decreasing in θ (see Appendix B). As a consequence, there can only exist equilibria in which the patenting strategy (2.1) has
The evaluation of Φ b for extreme values of θ yields the following.
Consequently (due to continuity), only critical values θ <θ b < θ can be consistent with the equilibrium patenting strategy. The equilibrium threshold value θ b i st h er oo to f :
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
In case of Cournot competition, notice that e Φ c in (A.2) is continuous in θ and de- 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3. It is easy to show that the function e Φ c (θ) is decreasing in λ,since∂ e Φ c /∂E{θ I |θ I >θ} < 0, as follows from (A.1). Further, e Φ b is increasing in λ,since∂ e Φ b /∂E{θ I |θ I ≤ θ} > 0 as follows easily from (A.3). Again, using continuity of e Φ c and e Φ b , and applying Milgrom and Roberts (1994, Theorem 1) gives the comparative statics results with respect to λ. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3. In Appendix B, I show that the function e Φ c (θ) is decreasing in N for any given θ. Further, Appendix B shows that e Φ b is increasing in N. Again, using continuity of e Φ c and e Φ b , and applying Milgrom and Roberts (1994, Theorem 1) gives the comparative statics results on N. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3. First, Appendix B shows that the function e Φ c (θ) is decreasing in β for any given θ. Second, Appendix B shows that lim β→0 ∂ e Φ b /∂β < 0. Due to continuity of ∂ e Φ b /∂β in β, there exists a critical degree
This function is non-decreasing in θ at extremal roots, since it is continuous in θ,a n d e φ 
Since inequality (B.2) implies ∂Φ c (θ; S)/∂θ > ∂Φ c (θ; {θ})/∂θ, the following holds:
B.1.1 Number of Firms
Consider any given technology θ <θ<θ.T h ef u n c t i o n e Φ c (θ) in (A.2) can be written as:
Hence, differentiating with respect to N gives:
B.1.2 Degree of Substitutability
As before, for any given technology θ <θ<θ,t h ef u n c t i o n e Φ c (θ) in (A.2) can be written as:
Differentiating this expression with respect to β gives:
B.2 Bertrand Competition
Consider any given set S ⊆ [θ, θ]. F i r s t ,i ti su s e f u lt os h o wt h a tΦ b (θ; S) in (A.3) is increasing in E{θ I |θ I ∈ S}:
Differentiating this expression with respect to θ gives:
This inequality implies ∂Φ b (θ; S)/∂θ < ∂Φ b (θ; {θ})/∂θ,w h e r e :
B.2.1 Number of Firms
Consider any given technology θ <θ<θ.T h ef u n c t i o n e Φ b (θ) in (A.4) can be written as: (1 − β)(2 − β)(α − θ) − (βN) 2 (θ − θ)¯, I distinguish the following cases.
, then (3.9) gives:
Inequalities (B.4) and (B.5) imply that φ
2 (θ − θ)), the following holds:
where
Substituting these expressions in the first order condition (C.2) gives:
By using ϕ(θ I )=t I ,t h i se q u a l i t yi se q u i v a l e n tt o :
Using (C.1), this can be written as: )θ, which is similar to (14) in Anton and Yao (2003) . In equilibrium, the innovative firm patents technologies of relatively low efficiency (i.e., θ I ≥ β 2 θ +(1− β 2 )θ), while it does not patent technologies that are more efficient. Second, if protection is strong, it is possible to obtain an explicit solution too. Clearly, it follows from applying the constraints ϕ(θ I ) ≥ θ I and ϕ(θ I ) ≤ θ to equation , then the inequality becomes ϕ 0 (θ I ) ≥ 1 for any θ I , which implies that the constraint ϕ(θ I ) ≥ θ I becomes binding.
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy gives full patenting (i.e., b ϕ(θ I )=θ I for any θ I ) if γ ≥ 1 − β 2 .F o rs u fficiently strong protection, the signaling effect dominates, which gives firm I an incentive to patent its innovation completely. (e.g., γ ≤ 0.45), the innovative firm keeps its most efficient technologies secret, and signals by patenting only lesser efficient technologies (i.e., b ϕ(θ I ) >θ I ). Moreover, the numerical examples suggest that the equilibrium strategies are concave in θ I .A l s ot h i s means that firm I tends to skew its patenting strategy in the direction of inefficient technologies. For protection parameter values close to 1 2 (e.g., γ =0 .475), concavity of the equilibrium strategy gives full patenting of efficient technologies, and partial patenting for less efficient technologies (i.e., b ϕ(θ I )=θ I if θ I ≤ b θ,a n db ϕ(θ I ) >θ I if b θ<θ I < θ,f o rs o m e b θ with θ < b θ<θ). Finally, Figure 5 suggests that stronger patent protection gives the innovative firm an incentive to patent a greater part of its innovation (i.e., ∂b ϕ(θ I )/∂γ < 0 for any θ I ). This is consistent with Proposition 3.
If protection is weak, the description of the equilibrium strategy b ϕ suggests that it is an increasing, concave transformation of θ I , i. Using similar arguments as before, the distribution of b ϕ becomes:
Convexity of g −1 in combination with g −1 ( b θ)= b θ and g −1 (θ)=θ yields: g −1 (y) ≤ y for any b θ ≤ y ≤ θ.T h i si m p l i e st h a tF ϕ(θ) (y) ≤ F θ (y) for any y ∈ [θ, θ]. In summary, the equilibrium patenting strategy appears to be such that the distribution of the patented technologies first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of technologies. In both cases, the equilibrium patenting strategy skews the technology distribution towards inefficient technologies. That is, when the innovation is divisible, then an innovative firm tends to patent small innovations to a greater extent than big innovations. By contrast, Proposition 1 shows that the firm has an incentive to do the opposite (i.e., patent big innovations to a greater extent than small innovations), when its innovation is non-divisible.
C.2 Timing
Consider the model where the patent validity is determined after the firms set their product market variables. In the subgame that starts after firm I patents its technology, a non-innovative firm chooses its product market variable that maximizes its expected profit π n (•; γθ +(1− γ)θ I ) for n ∈ {1, .., N},a n dfirm I expects to earn the profit π r I (θ I ,N[γθ +(1− γ)θ I ]; {θ I }) in equilibrium for r ∈ {c, b}.
C.2.1 Cournot competition
For any given S ⊆ [θ, θ] and θ I ∈ [θ, θ], firm I prefers secrecy if π
